Abstract-Two-transmitter Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel with multiple antennas at the transmitters, legitimate receiver and eavesdroppers is studied. The existence of unknown number of eavesdroppers is assumed but with maximum number of antennas at any eavesdropper limited to a known value NE. The channel matrices between the transmitters and the receiver is available everywhere, while the legitimate the legitimate transmitters and the legitimate receiver have no information about the eavesdroppers channels. A new upperbound is established and A new achievable DoF bound is provided and meets the upperbound. It is important to note that the same problem has been studied recently with arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channels and an upperbound has been derived. However, our achievable sum secure DoF exceeds their previously derived upperbound. Consequently, we revisited the uppperbound derivation and we re-derived a new mathematically robust upperbound.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner [1] , in which a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to send a message to a legitimate receiver (Bob), and hiding it from an eavesdropper (Eve). Wyner proved that Alice can send positive secured rate using channel coding. He derived capacity-equivocation region for the degraded wiretap channel. Csiszar and Korner found the region for the general wiretap channel [2] later, and it was extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3] .
A significant amount of work was carried thereafter to study the information theoretic physical layer security for different network models. The relay assisted wiretap channel was studied in [4] . The Degrees of freedom region of multiple access channel was presented in [15] . Using MIMO systems for securing the message was an intuitive extension due to the spatial gain provided by multiple antennas. The MIMO wiretap channel was studied in [5] - [13] and the secrecy capacity was identified in [8] . All these previous works assumed the availability of either partial or complete channel state information. Given that the eavesdropper is passive, it is much more important to study the case that the channel state information are completely unknown. The authors in [10] , [11] study the secrecy capacity and secure DoF (SDoF) for different MIMO channels when the eavesdropper channel This work was supported in by Qatar National research Program under grant NPRP 5-559-2-227 is arbitrarily varying and its channel states are known to the eavesdropper only. Arbitrarily varying means the eavesdropper channel take a value out of a finite set. They assumed that this set and the exact state are not revealed to the legitimate nodes Meanwhile, the idea of cooperative jamming was proposed in [9] , where some of the users transmit independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise to improve the sum secrecy rate. Cooperative jamming was then used for deriving the secure DoF for different networks. In [15] , cooperative jamming was used to jam the eavesdropper and proved that the MAC channel with single antenna nodes has
In this paper, we study the MIMO broadcast channel with unknown eavesdropper CSI at the legitimate transmitters and receiver. We provide an upperbound for the achievable secure DoF and determine the exact sum secure DoF by providing the achievable scheme, we show that our scheme is optimal and show that the achievable bound and the new upperbound are tight. No transmission cooperation is necessary.
A similar problem was previously studied in [11] and a claim made about the secure DoF region. They considered the case of only one eavesdropper and arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channels. As we assume completely unknown eavesdropper channels, we study a generalized model of theirs, and the DoF cannot be any smaller. However, our achievable bound exceeds the previously derived upperbound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the system model and the secrecy constraints. In section III the new upperbound is derived and the achievable scheme is presented in section IV. We conclude in section V. We use the following notation, a for vectors, A for matrices, A † for the hermitian transpose of A and Null(A) to define the nullspace of A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication system of two transmitters and single receiver in existence of unknown number of passive eavesdroppers. Transmitters one and two are equipped with We can write the received signal at the legitimate receiver at the tth time instant as
and at the jth eavesdropper as,
where H i is the N × M i matrix containing the channel coefficients from transmitter i to the receiver. Where G j i is the N × M i matrix containing the channel coefficients from transmitter i to the eavesdropper j. V i is the precoding matrix at transmitter i n l (t) and n j e (t) is the N e j × 1 are the N × 1 additive white Gaussian noise vector at the legitimate receiver and the jth eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that the transmitters know the number of the eavesdropper antennas but they do not know the channels any of G j 1 and G j 2 . We assume that N E < M , we use the variable M = M 1 + M 2 to define the total number of transmitting antennas and the eavesdropper with the maximum number of antennas (N E ) is called E m .
The secure DoF is defined as,
Under a secrecy constraint
Given that,
Where,
III. MAIN RESULTS
The sum secure DoF of the two user MAC channel is
Meanwhile, if transmitter cooperation exists and they can share a common random Jamming signal. The sum secure DoF is
IV. CONVERSE
In this part we provide the converse proof for the new upperbound the secure DoF of the two user MAC channel. We will follow similar steps to that of the converse of the MIMO MAC Channel. We consider the case where there is only one eavesdropper with N E antennas, this in turn is an upperbound for the multiple eavesdroppers case. We will omit the eavesdropper superscripts as we consider one eavesdropper for the ease of reading. Let W 1 and W 2 are the first and the second transmitter messages, respectively. The secrecy capacity can be upperbounded as,
−N E log(1 + c 7 P ) + nc 6 (25)
All C i = 1 : 7 are constants independent of P. In 17, we introduce random vectorsX j = X j +N , whereN j is an i.i.d. sequence of Gaussian random variableN j which is zeromean and of variance σ 2 j < {min(
, where η i is the smallest eigenvalue of H i and γ i is the smallest eigenvalue of G i . All {N j } 2 j=1 are mutually independent, and are independent of all other random variables. consequently, X j is a slightly noised version of the channel input X j , where 19 is due to h(Y 1 , Y e |X 1 , X 2 ) ≤ nc 8 , which is proved in [15] . Given that the receiver has only N antennas, then
Combining (26) and (27) together, we get Suppose we use a known sequence that is known to all transmitters and receivers for the message W e1 and a genie provides W 1 to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper then knows transmitter one signal and can subtract it from its received signal. This is equivalent to G 1 = 0, so the resulting X channel becomes identical to the Z channel of Figure(IV.a) . However, neither setting W e 1 to a known sequence, nor providing genie information to receiver two can decrease the performance of the coding scheme. Therefore the DoF tuble for the modified channel is upperbound as, Similarly, using the modified Z channel in figure (IV.b),
Combining (29) and (30), we have
and from (19), we have,
then,
From (26), (27) and (33), we have
V. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME For securing the messages sent by the users we make the transmitters send N E jamming signal vector x J with random symbols chosen from the same constellation using a jamming precoders V This Jamming signal overwhelm the eavesdropper signal space, and the eavesdropper ends up with zero DoF.
and lim
As the eavesdropper is now completely blocked, Next, we will show how the Jamming signal directions are designed to maximize the secure DoF. We will first study the secure DoF for M ≤ N , then go for M > N with different regions of the relations between , of dimensions J 1 and J 2 , respectively, such that J 1 + J 2 = N E , the Jamming signal is randomly chosen, a method we will name random jamming. The receiver then zero force the Jamming signal using the post processing matrix U as in (43). Accordingly, M − N E secure DoF can be sent and resolved by the receiver.
where a = Hv (44)
B. Achievability for M > N
For this region we will use three methods for jamming, aligned jamming, nullspace jamming and random jamming. Random jamming was described above the other two will be explained in the following.
Aligned jamming The jamming signals of both transmitter are aligned at the receiver received signal space. Let I is the jamming space at the receiver, we want each transmitter align a part or the whole of its jamming signal into that jamming space. The main problem that the total signal space of user one and user two occupies M 1 and M 2 dimensions only at the receiver, receptively. These Fig. 3 . The intersection of signal spaces at the receiver two spaces are distinct if M 1 < N , so we have to choose a common space to direct the Jamming signal into it.
let A 1 and A 2 span the received signal spaces of user one and two at the receiver.
and this intersection of subspace [17] would have positive size for only M ≥ N . We choose V 1 and V 2 such that,
While the systems of equations in (46, 47) has more variables than the number of equations, 45 makes sure that these systems has a solution as I lies in the spans of H 1 and H 2 . Let
where H i contains the M i rows of H and H i contains the other rows N − M i . and
where I i contains the M i rows of I and I i contains the other rows N − M i .
For the legitimate receiver to remove the jamming signal decode the transmitters' signal, it zero force the jamming signal using post processing matrix U as in (43).
For the case N E is odd, the half secure DoF is achieved by using real interference over one dimension at each transmitter where the jamming signal is transmitted over half of the real space and aligned over half dimension at the receiver like in [16] .
Nullspace jamming
In this jamming method one transmits sends V J 1 in the null space of the channel H 1 , while transmitter two sends J 2 dimensional jamming signal V J 2 in the nullspace of the channel H 2 .
This blocks J 1 + J 2 dimensions at the eavesdropper and leaves N free dimensions the legitimate receiver to attain the legitimate signal in addition to other jamming if needed.
In this region aligned jamming and random jamming is used, the first user signal is divided into two parts of sizes
+ . While the second user jamming signal size is J 1 . This scheme uses N E dimension of the transmitters signal space, so they can transmit at M − N E DoF to the receiver. On the other hand, the jamming occupies J s = J 1 + J 2 dimensions at the receiver. we will prove next that N − (J 1 + J 2 ) ≥ M − N E , or the legitimate signal and the jamming spaces are not overlapping.
for
In this region aligned jamming only is used, both users jamming signal size is
and the receiver losses J s = N E 2 dimensions for jamming. the achievable SDoF for this region is then,
which can be rewritten as
In this region only null space jamming is used. User one sends J 1 = min(N E , M 1 − N ) dimensional jamming signal and user two sends J 1 = N E − J 1 dimensional jamming signal in the null spaces of the legitimate receiver channels. This leaves the receiver with N secure DoF to decode and the upperbound is achieved.
In this region all three jamming methods are used, the first user jamming signal is divided into three parts of sizes
) and J 3 = N E − (J 1 + J 2 ). While the second user jamming signal size is J 2 . The first user uses nullspace jamming, aligned jamming and random jamming for its three parts, respectively/. The second user uses aligned jamming only. This scheme uses N E dimension of the transmitters signal space, so they can transmit at M − N E DoF to the receiver. On the other hand, the jamming occupies J s = J 2 + J 3 dimensions at the receiver. we will prove next that N − (J 2 + J 3 ) ≥ M − N E , or the legitimate signal and the jamming spaces are not overlapping.
B.5 Case M 1 > N, M 2 < N and
In this region, two jamming methods are used, the first user jamming signal is divided into two parts of sizes
). While the second user jamming signal size is J 2 . The first user uses nullspace jamming for its first part and aligned jamming for the second part which is aligned at the receiver with the second user's jamming. The jamming occupies J s = J 2 dimensions at the receiver.
and for
which can be rewritten as,
B.6 Case M 1 > N, M 2 ≥ N and N E ≥ M − 2N
In this region, two jamming methods are used, the each user jamming signal is divided into two parts of sizes J
